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ROBERT A. WALLACE
Attorney at Law, ISB# 1921
815 Park Blvd., Ste. 130
Boise, Idaho 83712
Telephone: (208) 342-0100
Facsimile:
(208) 343-2069

,I. DAVID NAVARRO, CleA
By ATOONE
QEPlIN

Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IN THE MATTER OF THE
DRIVING PRIVILEGES OF:

ITD File No. 807001283566
Idaho D.L. No. ZD298621A

GARY ALAN FEASEL,

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEW and STAY
Idaho Code §§ 18-8002A(8),
67-5270 et seq. and LRC.P., Rule 84

Petitioner

c

Fee Category: R2, $78.00

Petitioner Gary Alan Feasel, holder of Idaho Operator's License (herein "D.L.") NO
ZD298621A, petitions pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 18-8002A (8) and 67-5270 et seq. for review,
and for stay under Idaho Code § 67-5274 and I.R.C.P., Rule 84(m).
Petitioner's attorney states and certifies:
The name of the agency for which judicial review is sought is the Idaho Department of
Transportation,
The title of this district court is as shown above.

..
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The hearing was held November 27,2007 and final order was entered December 12,
2007 in an agency proceeding styled as:
"

IN THE IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT
STATE OF IDAHO

In the Matter of the
Driving Privileges of
GARY ALAN FEASEL

)
)

1

D.L. No. ZD29862lA
FILE No. 807001283566

The oral portion of the record was recorded by Hearing Examiner Michael B. Howell,
Attorney at Law. Pursuant to his custom it has by now been returned to the Idaho Department of
Transpoaation, Hearing Unit, 33 11 West State Street, Boise, Idaho 83720, and is in the custody
of that agency.
The issues asserted are: (a) the evidence showed that the presence of prozac in
petitioner's urine but did not indicate any particular level or impairment or intoxication; instead
showed that it had never had any effect on defendant, and this fact was not rebutted; (b) the

--

examiner applied an erroneous or nonexistent legal standard the provabiiity of a criminal

-

charge of driving under the influence rather than the statutory requirement that "the test results
indicated.. .the presence of.. .drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 188004.. .." (e) said legal standard "...presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in
violation of section 1808004..." is
(i) unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous and cannot support withdrawal of the
privilege of driving; and

(5)deprives drivers of procedural due process because it appears to be conclusive upon
the arresting officer's $? 18-8002A(4) affidavit, there being no express authority for the hearing
examiner to consider the probative value (if any) of the presence of a drug under 4 18-8002A(7);
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alternatively (d) that the findings of the Examiner were against the clear weight of the
testimonial and documentary evidence, which showed that there can be no '"failure" of a urine
test: such tests are qualitative (not quantitative), and cannot correlate time of driving, driver's
physical or mental impairment (if any) or blood levels with one another in any way - urine tests
only show that a person had at some time taken the drug whose presence is indicated.
A written transcript has been requested. By service of this petition on the agency
petitioner requests a written transcript of all oral proceedings, an estimate of the cost thereof so
petitioner may timely pay it, and agency-produced copies of the written record.
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays the court order:
1.

That pursuant to Idaho Code 5 67-5275(1) and I.R.C.P., Rule 84(g)(l)(A), time
be extended 42 days from the date of filing this petition for any fiuther necessary
cost estimates, payment for and preparation of agency transcript;

2.

That the order of December 12,2007 be stayed pending adjudication of this
petition, and any rehearing or appeal thereot

3.

That the court find, pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-5279, that said order was not
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, that it was contrary to
the legal standard applicable, that the legal standard as applied was
unconstitutional and violated petitioner's rights to substantive and procedural due
process; and/or that it was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion;

4.

That this case he remanded to the agency with directions to vacate the suspension
of petitioner's vehicle operator's license ab initio;

5.

That the agency pay petitioner's costs and attorney fees incurred in bringing this
appeal; and
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6.

For such other relief as the court deems just.

DATED this

Attorney for Petitioner
K?

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I /

I hereby certify that on t
of January, 2008 1caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing PETITION
REVIEW AND STAY to be &laced in the U.S.
Mail, postage prepaid and addressed as stated below; -transmitted by facsimile (fax) as so
indicated; and/or -hand delivered to the following:
Office of the Attorney General
Department of Transportation
33 11 West State
Boise, ID 83703

I

State of Idaho, Dept. of Transportation, Hearing Section
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129
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MICHAEL J. KANE
KANE & TOBIASON, LLP
1087 West River Street, Suite 100
Post Office Box 2865
Boise, Idaho 83701-2865
Telephone: (208) 342-4545
Facsimile: (208) 342-2323
Idaho State Bar No. 2652

Attorneys for Respondent

IN THIS DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH .kJDIcIAL

DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
In The Matter Of:

)

1
GARY ALAN FEASEL,

)

Case No. CV OC 0800408

1
Petitioner,

)
)

NOTICE OF FILING
AGENCY RECORD

1
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

1

Respondent.

)
)

)

COMES NOW Michael J. Kane, Special Deputy Attorney General and attorney for the
Respondent, IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT, in the above-entitled matter and
hereby notifies the Court and all parties that the agency record in the above-entitled mairer was filed
on January 17,2008.
DATED this

day of January, 2008.
KANE & TOBIASON, LLP

Attorneys for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

a

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of January, 2008, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below and addressed to
the following:
Mr. Robert A. Wallace
Attorney at Law
815 Park Blvd., Suite 130
Boise, ID 83712
[Facsimile: 343-2069]

/

U.S. Mail

Hand Delivesy
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

~~~
/z<<
kl4

MICHAEL J. KANE

I

I
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ROBERT A. WALLACE
Attorney at Law, ISB# 1921
290 Bobwhite Ct., Ste. 260
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone: (208) 342-0100
Facsimile:
(208) 343-2069
Attorney for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IN THE MATTER OF THE
DRIVING PRIVILEGES OF:

Case No. CV OC 0800408
PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF

GARY ALAN FEASEL,

Petitioner.

I.

FACTS
On his way to work at about 7:08 A.M., July 20,2007 Petitioner rear-ended another

North-bound motorist as both were waiting for a green lee-turn signal on Broadway turning
West onto Front Street, Boise, Idaho. Neither the records of this nor the resulting criminal cases
contained an accident report, suggesting there was no significant damage and no injuries.
Petitioner had slurred speech, appeared sleepy, and acknowledged taking medications.
He was processed for DUI and arrested. Administrative Record for Judicial Review (herein
"AR"), Pages 5,28 (AR 5,28); Reporter's Transcript Page 14, Lines 18-19 (RT 14:1 9 , Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, Paragraphs 11 and IX (FFCLO 1,3; AR 28,30). He
cooperated with his processing officer, took a breath test showing no trace of alcohol, AR 2, and
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submitted also to a urine test which was requested because he stated he was taking prescription
drugs. AR 4, RT 14-15. Defendant ultimately plead guilty to an infraction, following too
closely. AR 24.
A report of the State Laboratory, AR 9-10, ultimately was received by the Idaho

Department of Transportation. That report detected the presence of Fluoxetine (Prozac), noting
it was currently prescribed, but opining nothing about its concentration nor its effect (if any)
upon intoxication, impairment or other relationship to the activities of driving. This report was
the basis for the Department initiating this proceeding by suspending petitioner's license. AR 11.
Petitioner requested a hearing which was held November 27,2007 before Michael
Howell, Esq. sitting as designated hearing examiner for the department. Petitioner presented
facts about the four medications mentioned to the officer, AR 4, still in his medicine cabinet, RT
9-13, which all contained warnings against mixing with alcohol (e.g., RT 10:10-13; RT 11%-I1)
or using without knowledge of their effects. Citation infra. Petitioner corroborated the negative
alcohol BAC test by testifying he consumed no alcohol nor had any problems with impairment
from any of these medications alone or in combination in the past. RT 15:7-8, 16:23-17:l. The
Prozac, in particular, he had been using for three years. RT 14:22-3. The toxicologist testified
that long-term use of most medications increased tolerance and therefore diminishes their effect
on the person. RT 19:9-15.
Petitioner's toxicologist presented more unrebutted testimony: the urine test measured
only that Prozac had been taken by Petitioner, RT 21: 18-25. That fact alone could not support
any inference of impairment. 22:l-13; 23:2-8. He also underscored the label warnings'
language that driving was not a prohibited activity for users of Prozac, but that users should be
familiar with their effects before operating machinery. RT 20:12-16. When asked if the urine
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test results show anything wrong with a person's driving or ability to operate a vehicle, the
unequivocal answer was 'Wo." RT 23:16. The unrebutted testimony was that there may have
been anything i?om a large to a trace amount of Prozac in his system, but a urine test could be
neither "passed" nor "failed." RT 23:9-24: 17.
11. ISSUES
Is a qualitative blood or urine test enough to form the basis of an administrative license
suspension program like that set forth in Idaho Code 8 18-8002A without some quantitative
measurement or clear factual connection to a driving pattern or other evidence of impairment
attributable to those specific drugs?
Does the term "competent evidence" combined with "presence" of drugs give adequate
notice of what conduct is prohibited or allowed to drivers?
Must there be a factual, logical connection between detected drugs and actual impairment
for that evidentiary test to be passed or failed?
Did the legislature require there must be a nexus between impairment and substances, in
view of the DUI statute's more specific ("per se") references to amounts of alcohol needed to
prove impairment in blood, breath and urine?
111.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Idaho Code § 18-8002A(8) authorizes judicial review of a hearing officer's decision on
an administrative license suspension in the manner provided for judicial review of final
agency actions under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, chapter 52, title 67, Idaho
Code. Upon such judicial review, the hearing officer's decision must be affimed unless
the court finds that the hearing officer's findings or conclusions are:

(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory
authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion.
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I.C. $67-5279(3)."

State v. Kane; 139 Idaho 586, 589-90,83 P.3d 130 (Ct. App. 2003).
"The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA) governs the review of department
decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke, or restrict a person's driver's
license. See 1.C. $$49-201,49-330,67-5201(2), 67-5270. In an appeal from the decision
of the district court acting in its appellate capacity under IDAPA, this Court reviews the
agency record independently of the district court's decision. Marshall v. Idaho Depk of
Transp., 137 Idaho 337,340,48 P.3d 666,669 (Ct. App. 2002). This Court does not
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented.
I.C. $67-5279(1); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340,48 P.3d at 669. This Court instead defers
to the agency's findiigs of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Castaneda v. Brighton
Corp., 130 I d a h o m , 926,950 P.2d 1262,1265 (1998); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340,48
P.3d at 669. In other words. the azencv's factual determinations are binding on the
reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as
the determinations are supported by substantial competent evidence in the record.
Urruta v. Blaine ~ o m tex- rel. B$. of Comm's, &41daho 352,357,2 P.3d 738,742
(2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340,48 P.3d at 669.

- .

-

A court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the
agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not
supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion. I.C. Ej 67-5279(3). The party challenging the agency decision must
demonstrate that the agency erred in a m e r specified in I.C. Ej 67-5279(3) and that a
substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. Price v. Payetie County Ed. of County
Comm'rs, 13 1 Idaho..4l,429,958 P.2d 583,586 (1998); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340,48
P.3d at 669. If the agency's decision is not &med on appeal, 'it shall be set aside . . .
and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.' I.C. Ej 67-5279(3)."

State v. Talavera; 127 Idaho 700,905 P.2d 633 (1995) [Emphasis added.]; See also Matter of
Driver's License of Archer, Docket No. 33725, Court of Appeals of Idaho (2008).

IV.

ARGUMENT

An absurd example illustrates why urine tests should either be held insufficient to

suspend licenses, or require more scrutiny than they received here. A literal reading of
Code $1 8-8002A, Subsection (4)(a) would allow prosecution of any driver whose blood or urine
test f?om an approved state laboratory disclosed the mere presence of caffeine, or ibuprofen, or
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an antidepressant. But it does not, because the additional clause after "presence or drugs or other
intoxicating substances" says "in violation of section 18-8004...." It would exceed the statutory
authority of the Department to even process, much less find on a clear record l i e this one, a
"failure" of an evidentiary test without clear evidence of a violation. And a violation is shown
.by "other competent evidence." That evidence has to be evidence of impairment, or there is no
violation of 18-8004. Idaho Code $ 18-8004A(4)(a)would not then furnish a basis for even
initiating suspension proceedings.
DUI prosecutions, subject to rules of evidence and judicial gatekeeping, are proper
forums for proceedings involving drug impairment, as clear fkom Idaho Code § 18-8004(3) For
reasons set forth below, Idaho Code § 18-8004A(4)(a) is not. Using dmg presence tests to
suspend licenses is just too uncertain and beyond statutory defmition to begin administrative
action that affects driving privileges. Maintaining proceedings l i e these, therefore, should be
held beyond the statutory authority of the department.

A. "COMPETENT EVIDENCEn IS A VAGUE, UNCONSTITUTIONAL
STANDARD FOR DECISION
Defendant submits that the term "competent evidence" is at best ambiguous, if not vague.
As unrebutted by toxicological testimony in this case demonstrated, urine tests in particular are
meaningless if used to prove impairment or intoxication. Considering these kinds of "junk
science" passing or failing also conflicts with more specific statutory levels of alcohol set for
urine as the legislature has set which govern impairment per se. They should not trigger notices
of suspension without a prior determination that they caused impairment or were intoxicating.
The statute provides no review for that prior to hearing, allows the department to engage in a
mini-DUI trial as it did here, and allows a result beyond the terms and the stated purposes of the
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ALS program by authorizing use of evidence beyond the passage or failure of the evidentiary test
itself.
Without some gatekeeping control of state lab test results, this vague branch of the DUI
statute is simply unreliable on its face. It encourages administrative use of "scientific" evidence
that actually proves nothing about impairment or intoxication. It is not "competent" because it
logically proves nothing about the crime. Simply because that result might be theoretically
admissible, as the product of the state lab, does not make it relevant to nor even connected to a
violation of law. Moreover, as noted in Section D below, it actually conflicts with more specific
legislative provisions in the DUI statute that prescribe levels of alcohol in urine.
The Idaho Supreme Court has noted that constitutional challenges to statutes' vagueness
may be either facial or as they may be applied to other persons or situations. State v. Cobb et al;
132 Idaho 195 (1998, Fn.l), citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,610,93 S.Ct. 2908,
2915,37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 80 S.Ct. 519,4 L.Ed.2d 524
(1960), or that the ordinance can only be constitutionally applied to some of the conduct
described in it. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 102 S.Ct. 1186,71

The void-for-vagueness doctrine is premised upon the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. This doctrine requires that a statute defining criminal conduct be
worded with sufficient clarity and defiiteness to permit o r d i i y people to understand
what conduct is prohibited and to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Id.
An enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defied. Id. Due
process requires that all be informed as to what the state commands or forbids and that
persons of common intelligence not be forced to guess at the meaning of the criminal
law. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho lB, 197,969 P.2d 244,246 (1998). A statute may be void
for vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence
concerning the conduct it proscribes or if it fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern
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law enforcement or others who must enforce the statute. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712,69
P.2d at 132.
State v. Casano, 140 Idaho 461,95 P.3d 79 (Ct. App. 2004).

When does a person's drug use become a violation of the DUI law? Most people assume
it would only occur when there is competent evidence that such use caused impairment or was
intoxicating. This should be the plain meaning of "competent evidence," and it is how the statute
should work. But the way the program actually works, every chemical test that shows a urine
sample tainted with any drug will trigger a suspension. See Kane, supra.' Without some
mechanism for review or meaninghl contest to officers' field suspicions, other than mere
presence of any drug triggering automatic suspensions of operators' driving privileges, both the
statute and the process of (i 18-8002A give insufficient notice of what drivers can and cannot do.

B. WITHOUT PROOF OF CAUSATION URINE TESTS ARE NOT
COMPENT EVIDENCE
The common legal definition of "competent" in the field of evidence applies to witnesses,
not their testimony. Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 601 et seq. To stretch it to cover scientific
evidence like urine tests requires an even more strained reading of the rules of evidence, because
scientific evidence is covered by Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rules 701 et seq. and presupposes the
admitting foundation of expert witnesses. The entire suspension process is devoid of any expert
analysis of the effect of a "failed" drug result and driving. In this case it was affirmatively
proven that none existed.

I

Kane describes the process in a case like this: "If an evidentiary test of blood or urine was administered rather
than a breath test, the peace officer or the department shall serve the notice of suspension once the results are
received. The sworn statement required in this subsection shall be made on forms in accordance with rules adopted
by the department.
Upon receipt of such documentationfrom a law enforcement office the ZTD must suspend the person's driver's
license. I.C. 8 18-8002A(4)(a)." [Emphasis added.]
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Therefore the term "competent evidence" as used in Idaho Code 8004(3), if adopted to
give content to 9 18-8002A, is ambiguous. As applied to this case, where an expert without any
rebuttal whatsoever stated that the urine test proved nothing, it is "junk science."
It is not necessary to construe statutes if their meaning is clear and unambiguous. The
reason the phrase "competent evidence" is ambiguous is that specific levels of bodily fluid levels
of alcohol have been set by the legislature. Other than alcohol levels, the law leaves open (very
far open) the areas where "competent evidence" may show violation of the law prohibiting
driving while under the influence of "alcohol or drugs or other intoxicating substances."
Drug evidence is logically and legally connected (because the legislature says it is) to
intoxication or impairment. But it doesn't violate the statute if it is not in fact connected with
intoxication or impairment, or in any way is causally connected to that element of the crime of
DUI. The department's automatic suspension process must, at the time such information is
acquired, vacate the suspension. Failure to do so is merely to rubber-stamp the suspicions of a
field officer, neglecting the critical fact-fmdiig role of the hearing process.
Similar exclusion of non-causal scientific evidence, otherwise admissible, is discussed in
Swallow v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho; 138 Idaho 589,67 P.3d 68 (2003), which held it not

competent to support the causation element of plaintiffs claim:
"The instant case is similar to Bloching v. Albertson's, Inc., 129 Idaho 844,934 P.2d 17
(1997), in which we upheld the grant of summary judgment because of the lack of
competent evidence showing causation. In Bloching, the plaintiff had been taking beef
insulin for his diabetes. He suffered one seizure every four to six weeks because of
hypoglycemic reactions to insulin. His insulin prescription was then filled with a
combination of beef and pork insulin because the pharmacy was out of beef insulin. The
pharmacist stated that the blend of beef and pork insulin was a direct substitute for beef
insulin. Immediately after the plaintiff began using the insulin blend, he suffered a
seizure. As he continued using the insulin, he suffered seizures on a daily basis, and they
were considerably more violent than those he had previously experienced. After a week
he discontinued using the insulin blend, but he continued to suffer violent seizures.
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The plaintiff sued the pharmacy for negligence. His treating physician testified in his
deposition that although it was possible that the switch to the insulin blend caused
permanent injury, in hi opinion it had nothing to do with the seizures. The district court
ultimately dismissed the lawsuit on the pharmacy's motion for summary judgment
because there were not sufficient admissible facts to demonstrate a genuine dispute
regarding the proximate cause of the plaintiffs alleged injuries. On appeal, we affrmed
the dismissal because 'the record contains no credible, admissible testimony in opposition
to Albertson's motion for summary judgment.' 129 Idaho at 847,934 P.2d at 20. The
temporal relationship between the taking of the insulin blend and the onset of more
fkequent and severe seizures was not sufficient
to prove causation.
We have previously held that a lay person was not qualified to give an opinion about the
cause of a medical condition or disease. Bloching v. Albertson's, Inc., 129 Idaho 844,934
P.2d 17 (1997) (lay person was not qMed to testify that the seizure he suffered
immediately after using a blend of pork and beef insulin was caused by the insulin);
Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210,796 P.2d 87 (1990) (husband was not
qualified to testify that conduct by sheriff's deputies on April 15, 1987, in grabbing and
shaking his wife was a cause of her cardiac arrest and death over eleven months later);
Flowerdew v. Warner, 90 Idaho 164,409 P.2d 164 (1965) (patient was not qualified to
testify that hi injury was caused by physician's treatment). In his lower extremities, both
of which indicated he had a possible history of cardiac problems. The cardiologist also
testified that Mr. Swallow's use of "fat burner" pills containing ephedrine, which is
associated with heart attacks, clouds the issue of the cause of his heart attack.
Opinion Evidence § 207 as follows:
Where the subject matter regarding the cause of disease, injury, or death of a person is
wholly scientific or so far removed from the usual and o r d i i experience of the average
person that expert knowledge is essential to the formation of an intelligent opinion, only
an expert can competently give opinion evidence as to the cause of death, disease or
physical condition.
118 Idaho at 214.796 P.2d at 91.
The same considerations that disqualified the lay testimony in the above cases apply here.
Whether or not the Cipro taken by Mr. Swallow was a cause of his heart attack is a matter
of science that is far removed fkom the usual and ordinary experience of the average
person. A jury, comprised of lay people, is simply not qualified to determine that issue
without the assistance of expert testimony establishing that Cipro can cause a myocardial
infarction. Absent such testimony, any finding in that regard would be based upon
speculation. In granting the motion for summary judgment, the district court wrote, '[Iln
this case without some reliable expert testimony relating Cipro to myocardial infarction,
there is no chain of circumstances from which causation reasonably could be inferred.'
The district court did not err in granting Dr. Blahd's motion for summaryjudgment."
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Without the connection of causation, expert testimony is simply inadmissible, irrelevant and "not
competent." Similar restrictions should be demanded of "scientific' material used by
administrative tribunals, especially when their processes are automatically triggered by any lab
report showing "drugs." All triers of fact must be gatekeepers of such material in determining
violation of the law. That should be their legal responsibility. Here it was affimatively avoided.
The department's legal responsibility to assess the passing or failing of the test was thus avoided.
The department should have considered the facts before it, not simply rubber-stamped the
suspicions of the officer at the scene of a non-injury, unreported minor vehicle accident. Failure
to do so was an abuse of discretion or, minimally, failure to consider substantial competent
evidence in the record.
C.

STATUTORY ADMISSIBILITY IS NOT ENOUGH

Petitioner acknowledges that the state lab report is intended by the legislature to be
considered by courts and hearing examiners. But in this case Petitioner's expert rendered his
unrebutted opinion that, with respect to urine testing, qualitative results do not have any
connection to impairment or intoxication. Otherwise stated, in this case it is an unrebutted
scientific fact that mere presence of various drugs or intoxicating substances has nothing to do
with a person's ability to drive.
However, statutory foundation is not enough for admissibility, relevance or - for
suspension purposes - a decision that a test was "failed." Relevant evidence may be excluded if
its probative force is outweighed by unfair prejudice. Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 403.
Competency (if applicable to evidence, as opposed to witnesses) must also require some
gatekeeping as to reliability. Comment to Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 601 (I), pp. 2-3, State
v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 671,682 P.2d 571 (1984). Had the examiner in this case considered the
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unrebutted evidence of the toxicologist, he could not have found that Petitioner "hiled" his urine
test simply because Prozac was present. His reliance instead upon other facts apparent to the
officer did not discharge his responsibility to determine passage or failure of the test - his
statutory responsibility under Idaho Code § 18-8002A.
"This Court reaffirms that the appropriate test for measuring the scientific reliability of
evidence is I.R.E. 702.(footnote omitted)". State v. Gleason; 123 Idaho 62 844 P.2d 691 (2002),
discussing State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878,811 P.2d 488 (1991). Because the per se prong of
518-8004 specifically quantifies certain concentrations of alcohol in breath, blood and urine as
per se violations of law, Stafe v. HardesQ, 136 Idaho 707,39 P.3d (Ct. App. 200'2), the
concentrations or other measurements of such substances must also create an inference of
influence or intoxication.
The approach of the department would have reached the same result if Petitioner's urine
had contained caffeine and ibuprofen compare - Page 4 above. The concern is not the nature of
the drugs, but the absence of any causal connection between their mere presence and the legal
requirement that in order to violate 18-8004, a person must be under the influence of such a
substance, a combiiation of that and alcohol, or be intoxicated.
Under the rule of lenity, criminal or penal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of
the accused. State v. Mills, 128 Idaho 426,913 P.2d 1196 (1996);. State v. Barne,~,
124 Idaho
379,380,859 P.2d 1387,1388 (1993).
Evidentiary principles discussed in Subparagraphs A and B above protect doctors and
other litigants tiom unwarranted "junk science." Even though administrative tribunals aren't
bound by the rules of evidence themselves, somewhere in the process drivers must have the
opportunity to get the equivalent of pretrial review, judicial oversight, and standards applicable
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to experts and witnesses who claim to have special knowledge that a wrong occurred (but in fact
prove nothing but mere association). The same adjudicative evil rejected in Swallow, supra -that foreign substances in bodily fluid are harmhl- is presented by this case. The court has
power and duty to review the "science," to require a showing of at least some nexus with the
statutory element(s) of intoxication or impairment. If there is none, the department must be
denied its use.

D.

DRUG PRESENCE WITHOUT CONNECTION TO IMPAIRMENT
CONFLICTS WITH OTHER PRONOUNCEMENTS IN THE LAW

Idaho Code $18-8004(1) specifically provides that driving under the influence is a crime,
-and that it can be either the result of alcohol at specified levels, or a combination of drugs and
alcohol. Though Idaho Code $18-8004(2) enjoins prosecution of any person taking an approved

BAC test whose results are below .08 -- compare Sfafev. Mills, 128 Idaho 426,913 P.2d 1196
(1996) --Idaho Code $18-8004(3) qualifies that injunction by providing that a sub-.08 BAC like
defendant's does not bar prosecution if other "competent evidence" shows impairment or driving
under the influence. Its exact language says that the "competent evidence" must show a
violation of the statute itself, which means a violation of Idaho Code $ 18-8004(1)(a). That
subsection contains the actual conduct prohibited. Such conduct is plainly being under the

influence of alcohol, drugs, intoxicating substances or a combination thereof.
The statute goes on to specifically provide for levels of alcohol in blood, breath and
urine. These per se levels express the only legislative direction about what may be intoxicating
or impairing. The rest is left to supposition.
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Expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of
another). See Ace Realty, Znc. v. Anderson, 106 Idaho 742,749,682 P.2d 1289, 1296 (Ct. App.
1984). If the legislature gave a specific direction about how urine tests can be considered, the
attempt to read the law allowing their use for other purposes creates an ambiguity in the law.
When a court must engage in statutory construction, its duty is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the legislature. State v. Shanks, 139 Idaho 152, 154,75 P.3d 206,
208 (Ct.App.2003). In so doing, we look to the context of the statutory language in
question and the public policy behind the statute. Id .; State v. Cudd, 137 ldaho 625,627,
51 P.3d 439,441 (Ct.App.2002). When an ambiguous statute is part of a larger statutory
scheme, we not only focus upon the language of the ambiguous statute, but atso look at
other statutes relating to the same subject matter and consider them together in order to
discern legislative intent. Shank, 139 Idaho at 154, 75 P.3d at 208; State v. Paciorek, 137
Idaho 629,632,51 P.3d 443,446 (Ct.App.2002). Even when a statute is not ambiguous
on its face, "judicial construction might nevertheless be required to harmonize the statute
with other legislative enactments on the same subject." Winter v. State, 117 Idaho 103,
106,785 P.2d 667,670 (Ct.App.1989). We also are obligated to apply the doctrine of
lenity, which requires courts to construe ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of the
accused State v. Wees, I38 Idaho 119,124,58 P.3d 103, 108 (Ct.App.2002) [Emphasis
added.]

Stofe v. Dewey, 131 Idaho 846,848,965 P.2d 206,208 (Ct.App.1998). The same
standard should apply to statutes governing civil forfeitures, as important, valuable rights or
privileges are at stake.
The legislature actually never defined "influence" or "intoxicating substances."
However, it specifically provides in the same statute for blood, urine and breath levels of alcohol
only in the "per sewdefinition of the DUI offense itself. These levels there set were held to be
elements of the crime itself. Sfate v. Hardesty, 136 ldaho 707, 39 P.3d (Ct. App. 2002). Unless
evidentiary tests are similarly specific, or at least have some connection to the harm prohibited
by the law (intoxication, impairment), using them to summarily forfeit drivers' licenses violates
constitutional principles of .fair notice about conduct proscribed, clear rule of decision for the
department, and substantive due process of law with respect to what must be proven to show that
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no violation of the DUI statute was or could be shown by the particular brand of "evidence" used
in these proceedings.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The unrebutted record established the urine test indicated a mere presence of drugs, with
no quantitative measurement and no connection to impairment or intoxication. The hearing
examiner ignored this fact and the overwhelming weight of others showing no connection
between Prozac and the suspicions of the officer triggering the suspension case.
He abused his discretion and departed from the department's statutory mandate that only
a test "failure" can trigger or sustain license suspension, by fmding irrelevant the evidence that
the drug test before him could be neither passed nor failed. But even if it was proper to consider
it, the statute itself was not clear enough to admit tests other than those pertaining to alcohol or
other drugs that have a clear connection to impairment. Petitioner therefore respectfully requests
the court order the department to restore his driving privileges.

R O B ~ R TA. WALLACE
Attorney for Petitioner
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IN THIS DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

1

In The Matter Of:

)
)
)
)

GARY ALAN FEASEL,
Petitioner,
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

NOW

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

1
1
)

1
)
)

Respondent.
COMES

Case No. CV OC 0800408

Respondent,

STATE

OF

IDAHO,

DEPARTMENT

OF

TRANSPORTATION (hereinafter "Department"), by and through its attorney of record, Michael J.
Kane of the fm Kane & Tobiason, LLP, and hereby submits the Respondent's Brief on review to
the above-entitled Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On July 20, 2007, sometime shortly before 7:00 a.m., Gary Alan Feasel (hereinafter
"Petitioner") rear-ended a vehicle at the intersection of Broadway and Front Street, Boise, Idaho.
The police were called, and Petitioner had contact with two (2) peace officers - M.Chally and J.
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Tucker. According to the affidavit of Officer Tucker, Petitioner admitted to having taken Ambien
CR, Lithium, Prozac and Wellbutrin. Officer Tucker performed field sobriety tests upon Petitioner
and found that Petitioner exhibited slurred speak, impaired memory, and that he failed the gaze
nystagmus, walk and turn, and one leg stand tests. (R. 003-004).
Petitioner was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI), and submitted to a breath
alcohol test. That test resulted in .00% BAC. (R. 004). It also transpired that Petitioner was
driving without privileges and was cited accordingly. (R. 005).
Although an administrative license suspension (ALS) was served on Petitioner, that was
cancelled pending the result of a urine test. (R. 008). In due course, a urinalysis report performed
by the Idaho State Police Forensic Services Laboratory was received indicating the presence of
fluoxetine, commonly known as Prozac. (R. 009).
Petitioner was notified on October 30, 2007, of an administrative license suspension. @.
01 1-013). Petitioner requested an administrative hearing in a timely fashion. (R. 014-015).
On November 27, 2007, a telephonic hearing was had before Hearing Officer Michael
Howell. Petitioner presented evidence from his daughter which consisted of reading to the hearing
officer the warning labels attached to the prescription bottles on Petitioner's Ambien, Wellbutrin,
Lithium and Prozac. As to Ambien, the evidence was that it caused drowsiness or dizziness, and
Petitioner had been warned that his ability to drive might be impaired. Petitioner was further
warned to use care until he became familiar with its effects. (Tr. 9). As to Wellbutrin, Petitioner
was warned that drowsiness was a side effect, and was further warned to use care when operating a
car. (Tr. 10). As to Lithium, Petitioner had been warned that a side effect was drowsiness, and was
further warned to use care when operating a car. (Tr. 11). As to Prozac, Petitioner had been
warned that taking the medicine "may lesson [sic] your ability to drive." (Tr. 11).

-
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Petitioner testified that he had a valid prescription for the aforementioned dfugs. (Tr. 13).
Although Petitioner admitted to taking the four (4) pills for the four (4) medications, he was unclear
which he had taken at approximately 5:30 a.m. that day. He stated that he had been on Lithium and
Prozac for three (3) years, but Ambien and Wellbutrin for only about a month. ( r 14-15). He
claimed he had never noticed a problem in the past while taking the four medications. (Tr. 15).
Petitioner also presented testimony kom Loring Beds ("Beals"), a toxicologist, pertaining
to the effects of Prozac. Among the generally hypothetical nature of Beals's testimony was an
opinion that only when a person is not reasonably certain of the effects of Prozac is when he should
not drive. (Tr. 21). Beals then went on to opine that urine tests were generally useless in that they
did not draw conclusions regarding quantitative amounts. (Tr. 21-23).
Petitioner also presented the hearing officer with "the tape" regarding "Mr. Feasel's
statements that he made or didn't make to the officer about what supposedly knew [sic] about
taking the drug ... ." (Tr. 24-25).'
The hearing officer upheld the suspension. (R. 028-030). The hearing officer specifically
noted that he had considered the exhibits. (R. 028). The hearing officer found that "[w]hile alcohol
requires quantification, a violation for drugs requires a determination of the presence of drugs,
combined with indications of impairment." (R. 029). Finding that the condition of the driver at the
time of the incident is all that is relevant, the hearing officer found that "[tlhe officer gave
numerous indications that the driver was impaired. Those observations combined with the results
showing the presence of drugs were sufficient to establish a violation of LC.

$5

18-8004 and 18-

8002A." (R. 030).

'

Although it is not clear in the transcript, "the tape" consists of two (2) exhibits - B and C - which are CD
recordings of approximately two (2) hours worth of conversations between Petitioner, police officers, and medical
personnel, both at the scene of the accident and at the Ada County Jail.

-
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Petitioner filed a timely Petition for Judicial Review. (R. 038-041).

STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the
evidence on questions of fact." Idaho Code

5 67-5279(1). The COLIII
shall affirm the agency action

unless the court finds "that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:
(a)

in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(b)

in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(c)

made upon unlawful procedure;

(d)

not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or

(e)

arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion."

Idaho Code 5 67-5279(3).

ARGUMENT
Before beginning an analysis of the Petitioner's claim, it is important to identify those
issues that are properly before a hearing oflicer in a given case. Idaho Code 5 18-8002A(7) lists
the five (5) areas to be dealt with by the hearing officer in a hearing on a suspension. These are:
1.

Whether the peace officer had legal cause to stop the person;

2.

Whether the officer had legal cause to believe the person had been driving under

the influence;
3.

Whether the test results showed an alcohol concentration in violation of Idaho

Code $5 18-8004,18-8004C or 18-8006;
4.

Whether the test results for alcohol concentration were conducted in accordance

with the requirements of Idaho Code $ 18-8004(4) or whether the testing equipment was
functioning properly when the test was administered; or

-
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5.

Whether the person was informed of the consequences of submitting to an

evidentiary test.
In all cases, the burden of proof is on the person requesting the hearing to a
preponderance of the evidence standard. Indeed, the statute directs the hearing officer not to
vacate the suspension unless one of the five aforementioned findings occurs.
Because the bulk of the Petitioner's briefing is an attack on the statutory scheme
pertaining to a suspension for violation of the Administrative License Suspension Act, it is
appropriate to outline how the statutes apply to one who appears to be under the influence of
drugs while driving a vehicle.
First, "[ilt is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of ... drugs ... to drive or
be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state

...

."

Idaho Code

5

18-

8004(l)(a).
Next, when an individual shows an alcohol concentration of less than 0.08, "other
competent evidence of drug use other than alcohol" is used in determining the guilt or innocence
of the defendant. Idaho Code 4 18-8004(3).
Finally, when a person is charged with driving under the influence of any drug, the fact
that the drug was obtained legally "shall not constitute a defense against any charge of a violation
of the provisions of this chapter. Idaho Code 5 18-8004(7).
As to the ALS, the ultimate finding of the defendant's guilt or innocence on the DUI
charge is not a factor.
The facts as found by the hearing officer shall be independent of the determination
of the same or similar facts in the adjudication of any criminal charges arising out
of the same occurrence. The disposition of those criminal charges shall not affect
the suspension required to be imposed under the provisions of this section.

RESPONDENTS BRIEF - P. 5

Idaho Code 8 18-8002A(7).
At the ALS hearing, the results of any tests for the presence of drugs shall be admissible,
as is the sworn statement of the arresting officer and the accompanying documents. The burden

of proof is on the Petitioner. Idaho Code 3 18-8002A(7).
ALS appeals are governed by the Idaho Rules of Administrative Procedure of the
Attorney General. IDAPA 39.02.72.003.
The rules of evidence as described by Attorney Generd Rule 600 are as follows:
Evidence should be taken by the agency to assist the parties' development of the
record, not excluded to frustrate that development. The presiding officer at
hearing is not bound by the Idaho Rules of Evidence. No informality in any
proceeding or in the manner of taking testimony invalidates any order. The
presiding officer, with or without objection, may exclude evidence that is
irrelevant, unduly repetitious, inadmissible on constitutional or statutory grounds,
or on the basis of any evidentiary privilege provided by statute or recognized in
the courts of Idaho. All other evidence may be admitted if it is of a type
commonly relied upon by prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs. The
agency's experience, technical competence and specialized knowledge may be
used in evaluation of evidence.
IDAPA 04.1 1.01.600.
Petitioner begins with an assertion that the term "competent evidence" of drug use
contained in Idaho Code

5 18-8004(3) is unconstitutionally vague. Respondent respectfully

submits that the aforementioned subsection is not relevant to the analysis. This is so because on
its face the subsection deals with how drug use can be considered when a person's alcohol
concentration is less that 0.08 "in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant." In
contrast, the ALS does not concern itself with the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Rather,
when a peace officer signs a sworn statement that there is legal cause to believe: a person had
been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of
drugs, the Department shall suspend the person's driver's license, which only may be vacated

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - P. 6

upon a demonstration that the peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person, that the
officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been driving while under the influence
of drugs, that the testing was faulty or that the person was not informed of the consequences of
submitting to evidentiary testing. Idaho Code 5 18-8002A(7)
This statute has explicitly been found to be remedial in nature and not punitive. State v.

Reichenberg, 128 Idaho 452, 915 P.2d 14 (1996). Hence, the portion of Idaho Code

5

18-8004

dealing with competent evidence to find guilt or innocence has no application.
In any event, the term "competent evidence" is not unduly vague. The Idaho courts on
numerous occasions have held that substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Jarvis v. Rexburg Nursing Center, 136
Idaho 579, 38 P.3d 617 (2001); Curtis v. M H King Company, 142 Idaho 383, 128 P.3d 920
(2005); Stolle v. Bennett, 145 Idaho 44, 156 P.3d 545 (2007). As can be seen, the definition of
substantial and competent evidence is virtually identical to that standard of evidence used in
administrative hearings as set forth in the Attorney General Rules.
Petitioner argues that evidence of drugs in one's system should not be admitted by the
hearing officer absent some demonstration of causation. Otherwise, the argument goes, a person
taking a simple pain killer could be prosecuted under the statute. It is submitted that it is not
possible to read the statute outlawing driving under the influence in the way Petitioner suggests.
In order to he guilty of the crime of driving under the influence, a person must have drugs in his
system, must be driving and, most important, must be "under the influence" of the drug. Idaho
Code

5

18-8004(1)(a). The term "under the influence" means impairment of physical or mental

function that relates to one's ability to drive. This may be shown by direct or circumstantial
evidence. State v. Bronnenberg, 124 Idaho 67,856 P.2d 104 (1993). No specific degree or state

-
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of intoxication is required, but only a showing that enough of the substance has been ingested as
to influence or affect the ability to drive. State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 844 P.2d 691 (1992).
Impairment may be demonstrated by observation of some type of ascertainable conduct or effect.
State v. Andrus, 118 Idaho 71 1, 800 P.2d 107 (1990). Given the relaxed level of evidence that
the hearing officer may consider under the rules, it is clear that the hearing officer may take
scientific evidence of a drug into consideration when accompanied by evidence of impairment.
That is certainly the case here.
In this matter, the Petitioner admitted to ingesting four (4) different drugs, any one of
which could reasonably be seen to have affected his driving. As a review of the tape of the
conversations with Petitioner will demonstrate, Petitioner was nodding off while behind the
wheel while the first officer on the scene was speaking to him. Although the tape is painhlly
unclear in sections, there is enough on the tape to demonstrate that the Plaintiff was in almost a
trance-like state and that he claimed that he had used Ambien approximately eight (8) or nine (9)
hours before for the first time. Ambien, as is well known, is a sleep agent. Given the failure of
several field sobriety tests, not to mention the rearend collision, causation cannot be seriously
challenged.
Petitioner also asserts that there must be a quantitative component to the drug testing.
Without this, it is asserted, the test is nothing more that junk science. In fact, it has been
explicitly ruled otherwise. The State is not required to establish a quantity of drugs in a
defendant's system in a prosecution for driving under the influence. State v. Lesley, 133 Idaho
23, 981 P.2d 748 (1999). If this is so in criminal prosecutions, it must follow logically that the
same ruling applies to remedial administrative proceedings.

-
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Petitioner asserts that "it is an unrebutted scientific fact that mere presence of various
drugs or intoxicating substances has nothing to do with a person's ability to drive." (Petitioner's
Brief, p. 10). Given this "unrebutted" evidence, the hearing officer should not have found that
the Petitioner "failed" his urine test "simply because Prozac was present." (Petitioner's Brief, p.
11).

In fact, the hearing officer did not find that Petitioner "failed" a drug test. Rather, it was
found that there were numerous indications that the driver was impaired. Petitioner seems to
limit his argument to Prozac, probably because the sole scientific test admitted by the hearing
officer demonstrated Prozac.

However, the hearing officer could not ignore the fact that

Petitioner admitted to ingestion of three (3) other drugs capable of affecting his driving, one for
the first time the night before. Nor should the hearing officer have ignored the fact that
Petitioner specifically admitted under oath the ingestion of those drugs.2
Simply put, it was not improper for the hearing officer to consider all of the evidence
before him, including the scientific evidence.

CONCLUSION
In the end, this court may only vacate the hearing officer's findings if they are
unconstitutional, in excess of statutory authority, made upon unlawful procedure, not supported
by substantial evidence on the record as a whole or arbitraiy. Given the overwhelming evidence
of impairment coupled with the admissions of the Petitioner, both to the police and to the hearing

2

The fact that the laboratory test only referred to Prozac is not particularly relevant in this case. It is unknown
whether Wellhutrin, Amhien or Lithium were even searched for in the testing, and it is unknown whether the
Wellbutrin, Lithium or Ambien had time to metabolize to the point where it could be found in the Petitioner's urine
at the time of the taking of the test. Petitioner did not argue that he was "only" affected by Prozac at the hearing.
When questioned at the scene of the accident, Petitioner only referred to the taking of Ambien. It was only later in
the course of events that Petitioner admitted to taking the other drugs, including the Prozac.
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officer, coupled with the scientific test, the hearing officer's decision was not only wholly
reasonable, it was virtually dictated by the facts.
DATED this

2 ~day'of May, 2008.
KANE & TOBIASON, LLP

BY:
MICHAEL J. KANE
Attorneys for Respondent
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Mr. Robert A. Wallace
Attorney at Law
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Boise, ID 83712
[Facsimile: 343-2069]
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Mail
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ROBERT A. WALLACE
Attorney at Law, ISB# 1921
290 Bobwhite Ct., Ste. 260
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone: (208) 342-0100
Facsimile:
(208) 343-2069
Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICLAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Case No. CV OC 0800408

IN THE MATTER OF THE
DRIVING PRIVILEGES OF:

PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF

II

GARY ALAN FEASEL,
Petitioner.

I.

INTRODUCTION

An administrative agency has a lot on its side when appealed. Its advocates always

argue that their clients strive to reflect the legislature's intent. Clearly, the law does impose upon
permitted drivers the double burden of prevailing at hearings and appealing carefully crafted
. fmdings of fact and conclusions of law.

Abundant law supports the discretion of administrative tribunals to select and interpret
facts. They have nearly unlimited authority to do so. Respondent properly relies on that settled
legal principle, and petitioner does not urge this court to reject it.
"It is an old adage among trial lawyers that when the law is on your side you argue the
law, when it is not you argue the facts, and when you have neither you pound the table."
State v. Hicks, No. 79143-1 (Wash. Supreme Court, 4/24/08), Chambers, J., concurring.
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Petitioner points to the written, statutory law and practical operation of the statutory
scheme's operation, and the preponderance of relevant facts. With deference to the skill and
experience of counsel for respondent, and the limited role of the court, when an agency exceeds
its statutory authority, the settled law on administrative discretion and judicial review can appear
like table-pounding.

11.

QUESTIONS ON REVIEW

Petitioner agrees that respondent, like every administrative agency, may find and apply
facts within the scope of its job to determine. Respondent's job is defmed by I.C. $18-8002A.
This case asks: 1) Could the department go beyond the evidentiary (urine) test itself, when
chalIenged that such test failed to show a violation of the DUI law, and 2) Was it in so doing
allowed to rely entirely on facts other than that evidentiary test?

111.
A.

ARGUMENT

Procedural Design Limits the Scope of Ageoey Inquiry

Respondent correctly reminds the court that the ALS process is essentially a selfexecuting, remedial procedure designed by the legislature to remove drivers from the road aRer
they fail an evidentiary test. It is designed to impose a certain, swiR remedy for failure of
defined chemical tests. It requires no action &om a driver other than to get arrested, fUrnish a
sample ofblood, breath or urine for chemical analysis, allow his arresting offcer to serve
material and then transmit same to respondent, the state department of transportation. One of
these items is proof that an evidentiary test was failed.
1.

Because it works, evidence of only one "chemical test" is pertinent

As is the case with every urine or blood evidentiaxy test under $18-8002A, this
proceeding did not begin until the results ofpetitioner's urine test were obtained. The presence
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of prozac in that test was the event that triggered the department's authority to suspend. Once
that material is in the hands of respondent, after 30 days of service a license is gone. Period. If a
hearing is requested only limited objections can be lodged, and each driver has the burden of
establishing by a preponderance of evidence that the objections are valid.
On the other hand, under $18-8002A(7)(c), the driver must regain his license if, after
objecting, a preponderance of evidence shows that:
(c) The test resuIts did not show an alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs or
other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004... [emphasis added]
To "violat[e] ... section 18-8004" a chemical test result must show impairment. If
challenged by a hearing request, the department's function and authority does not increase. It
remains limited by the same statute: the one that gives it authority to suspend if a test is failed.
Neither the department nor its hearing examiner get increased authority to try a DUI case. They
remain bound to decide, in accord with 5 18-8002A(7), if a test showed the presence of drugs,
and if that presence was shown by the test to be in violation of § 18-8004.
Petitioner respectfully submits that this question subject defines the outer limits of what
respondent was to consider in this proceeding. Was that test failed or not? Did it "show a
violation" of the DUI law or didn't it? If it did, the automatic suspension would be upheld. If
petitioner showed by a preponderance of evidence that that test did not show a violation of DUI
laws, he was entitIed to return of his license.
There is no other way to read subsection (c) of 18-8002A(7). The Iegislitture wanted a
driver's chemical test result to govern respondent's withdrawal of his license--without a hearing.
The law could and should not increase the department's authority if a hearing is requested and
conducted.
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Much of respondent's argument is about how much information the record gave the
hearing examiner to conclude that there was a violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004. But
evaluating "competent evidence" of intoxication is not, as respondent essentially concedes, the
department's role under § 18-8002A. It is to suspend licenses when an evidentiary test shows
the DUI law was violated. The statute posits a urine test (in the singular) like petitioner's

qualative result could do so. It nowhere says every urine test showing the presence of drugs
does.

B.

The Legislature's Intent That Suspension Be Swift Requires Also That It
Be Simple
I

State v. Mills, 128 Idaho 426,913 P.2d 1196 (1996) holds that when the legislature

said one test in 5 18-8004, it means one. The court should follow its logic and policy. This
principle has been respected by the legislature for 12 sessions, though other stronger
amendments and drug laws have proliferated.
The legislature has given the department no other ground for including additional
evidence in its inquiry. It specifically authorizes challenge to the probative value of a single test,
and only that. If no hearing had been requested, the suspension would have simply remained in
place, respondent would have imposed as a self-executed event. It would not have mattered if
the drug present in petitioner's urine had been caffeine, ibuprofen or heart medicine.
However, had it been ibuprofen, and an affected driver had presented the evidence
presented here, Mr. Howell could not have appropriately relied on surrounding circumstances to
decide that Advil in his urine proved he was intoxicated in violation of 8 18-8004. He would
have had to iind substantial evidence that Advil's presence violated § 18-8004. He could not
have done so, on the evidence of this record. He wuld not do it for Prozac either.
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IV.

THE DEPARTMENT EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY

The hearing examiner, like the department, was not supposed to see if a DUI could be
proven from everything he could learn from the record, its witnesses andlor its information,
whether offered by petitioner or investigated by himself. He was only authorized to hear
challenge that the urine test showed presence of something "in violation of' $18-8004 under
$18-8002A (7)(c). "Failing" evidentiary tests is what $ 18-8002A is about. When a driver
proves (as petitioner did) that the results of a given tests did not establish ("show") a violation of

LC. $ 18-8004 the job of the department is done.
Otherwise stated, all the department is supposed to do under $18-8002A is penalize a
driver that fails an evidentiary test. Once it received any test result, and only then, did it initiate
that action. That action was timely challenged. The hearing officer was authorized to take and
review evidence about that challenge. But then he looked at and relied completely on evidence
beyond that limited subject. He looked at all evidence of DUI, not evidence about the urine test.
The only evidence about the urine test or the effect of Prozac on petitioner was
presented by Mr. Beals, petitioner and his family. That evidence was preponderant, if not
conclusive, that he did not then nor ever had any previous problems with that drug. The
evidence was preponderant that the test itself, even if showing the presence of the drug in his
urine, could not show impairment or his condition the time he drove. And impairment
("intoxication") is necessary to violate $18-8004.
Only the foregoing facts about the urine test should have been considered by the
hearing examiner. The rest of the "competent evidence" of DUI is not about what the test (or
"presence of' any drug) does or does not show. Such evidence arguably subjects the statute to
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vagueness and statutory construction grounds, as argued in the main brief. It was offered
nevertheless by petitioner to illustrate what still remains an unrebutted fact: that no connection
between a violation of the statute and the actual drugs shown by the test existed nor was shown
to exist by the test nor by its surrounding circumstances.
The evidence of Loring Beals is unrebutted. Urine tests cannot be "failed" or "passed"
for purposes of Idaho Code $ 18-8004 because they do not indicate concentration or presence of
intoxicating substances in the blood, nor any connection between those substances and
intoxication or impairment. They can indicate the presence of drugs in the urine, and that the
"urinater" bad at some time ingested the drug in question. That doesn't violate 5 E 8-8004.
Simple logic therefore compels the conclusion: the department did not have competent
evidence of violation of § 18-8004. Other facts apparent to the officer, brought forth in the
hearing (and obvious from the facts) may be such evidence. But they have nothimg to do with
the evidentiary test -here the urine test -whose failure or passage is the only legitimate
departmental inquiry. Only a failure -a showing of DUI violation by that test -justifies the
remedy the department is authorized to impose under $18-8002A.
Only the result of the urine sample should have been the focus of the hearing before the
department. The arrest, probable cause to test for DUI and affidavit of the officer began the
process of departmental action, but that evidence neither authorized nor even commenced this
proceeding at the administrative level. No evidentiasy test was before the department; no
remedy was authorized nor was any remedial proceeding possible under the law. There had to
be results of a chemical evidentiary test. The urine test. Not the standardized field sobriety tests,
circumstances, vehicle accident, observations of defendant's condition or other "competent
evidence." None of that material authorized suspension by the department under 18-8002(A).
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V.

CONCLUSION

The evidentiary test-singular-results

were the urine test analysis of the lab. Once

received by the department, that reading authorized it to take action to impose the remedy of
suspension. That action is in fact a ministerial act. The hearing was only supposed to review it.
Petitioner urges the court look at the facts and the statute as written and applied - the
law and the facts as the legislature intended them to operate. The legal principles of judicial
forbearance petitioner will leave to respondent. What it did with the "drug test" was here clearly
outside the authority of the department and beyond the reach of the clear terms of the statute, and
beyond the design of the statutory mechanism. Respondent's suspension of petitioner's

Attorney for Petitioner
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

GARY ALAN FEASEL,

Case No. CV OC 08 00408

Petitioner,
vs.
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION
DEPARTMENT

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Respondent.

*

This case is an administrative appeaI from a decision by a hearing examiner of the
Idaho Department of Transportation sustaining the administrative license suspension of
petitioner pursuant to Idaho Code 4 18-8002A. For reasons stated, I reverse.

Pacts and Procedural History
In July of 2007, Feasel was involved in a minor traffic accident in Boise, Idaho.
Police responded, and during their investigation at the scene they determined that Feasel
exhibited impaired memory, slurred speech and the inability to perform a set of field
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sobriety tests. Feasel advised the investigating officer that he had taken a number of
prescription medications, including Ambien, Lithium, Wellbutrin and Prozac.
Feasel.was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs and taken
to the public safety building. There, he was administered a breath alcohol test, which
returned a reading of .00/.00. He then provided a urine sample that was sent to the Idaho
State Police Laboratories for testing. The result, which was returned in October of 2007,
revealed only the presence of fluoxetine, which is the generic name for the brand name
"Prozac."
ARer receipt of the state laboratory results, the investigating police officer issued
a notice of administrative license suspension. Upon timely request, a hearing was
scheduled before a hearing examiner of the Idaho Transportation Department.
At hearing, the label from the prescription drug "Prozac" was read into the record.
This label warned that use of the drug "may cause drowsiness," and cautioned that taking
the medication "may lessen your ability to drive ...."' Feasel testified that he had been
on Prozac (fluoxetine) for three years and had never noticed a problem with this drug.
(Evidence was also offered on the other drugs, but none of the other drugs were revealed
in the laboratory test. The evidence pertaining to the other drugs, then, is not relevant
here.)
The hearing examiner concluded that under LC.

9 18-8002A, the testing for drugs

need not contain a quantification but only an indication of the presence of a drug together
with indications of impairment. He concluded that the circumstances above, coupled with
the state lab test revealing only the presence of fluoxetine was sufficient to sustain the

' Hearing Transcript, page 1 1
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administrative suspension. A final order sustaining the suspension was entered. Petitioner
then filed a timely appeal to this court.
Analysis

The statute under examination reads as follows:

I.C. 5 18-8002A(4) Suspension: (a) Upon receipt of the sworn statement
of a peace officer that there existed legal cause to believe a person had
been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances and
that the person submitted to a test and the test results indicated an alcohol
concentration or the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in
violation of $5 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code, the
department shall suspend the person's driver's license, driver's permit,
driving privileges or nonresident driving privileges.
As is germane here, this statute has two requirements: first the officer
must have legal cause to believe that the subject was driving under the influence
of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substance, and second, there must be a test
result indicating the presence of that alcohol, drug or other intoxicating substance
in violation of the statutes.
A distinction must be drawn between the requirements of this statute when

examining a circumstance of alcohol intoxication as opposed to drugs or other
intoxicating substances. In the case of alcohol intoxication, the legal connection
between driving and impairment can be provided through the lay opinion of the
investigating officer. Under traditional common law principles of evidence, lay
opinion testimony on drunkenness or stage of intoxication is admissible. Finally,
it is common knowledge, and does not require expert qualification or foundation,
that ingestion of a sufficient quantity of alcohol will impair one's ability to
operate a motor vehicle. All that is required for the investigation part of the ALS
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showing is the officer's testimony that, upon sufficient investigation, he found
that the subject (1) had been driving, (2) had been drinking, and (3) was impaired.
The testing in alcohol cases, then, must demonstrate that the quantity of alcohol
found is sufficient to violate the provision of the law- i.e., a BAC of 0.08 or
greater. Note that in the case of an administrative suspension for alcohol
intoxication, the state does not have to prove that the amount of alcohol or degree
of intoxication was sufficient to cause the impairment of ability to drive - in fact,
in an administrative license suspension hearing such proof would be irrelcvant,
because the ALS statute requires evidentiary testing to show the necessary
quantity.
In the case of intoxication by drug or other intoxicating substances,
however, the same structure of proof does not necessarily apply. All drugs are not
alike, the term "intoxicating substance" is not defined, the testing described in the
statute does not spell out any quantities, and there are no legal or evidentiary
presumptions available to close any gaps. Without something more, the lay
opinion of the investigating officer may not be sufficient to link together the
circumstance of driving, drug ingestion and impairment.
Here, the most the officers could testify to was that Feasel demonstrated
certain elements of impairment - slurred speech, impaired memory and affected
gait. It might have appeared that he was under the influence of alcohol, in which
case the officer's opinion on public drunkeness might have sufficed - but the

BAC testing dispelled that suspicion. Upon inquiry, the subject did acknowledge
that he had prescriptions for a number of medications - Ambien, Wellbutrin,
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Lithium and Prozac, and the officer does state in his affidavit that Feasel had
"knowledge that he was not to operate a motor vehicle while taking these
medications,"' but there is no linkage in the affidavit to show that any of the
medications are, in fact, intoxicating substances, or that they could or did cause
the impairments demonstrated at the scene. There is no foundation in the record
that would support opinion testimony by either of the investigating officers that
the subject was under the influence of any of the specific drugs at the time of his
arrest, or even that the identified substances were intoxicating at all.
Feasel testified at the hearing that he had been taking Prozac for three
years without any noticeable effect. The label from the Prozac bottle was read into
evidence at the hearing, which indicated only that the drug "may" cause
drowsiness and cautioned that the user should determine its affect before
operating motor vehicles or heavy equipment. A toxicologist testified that the
cautionary label was one commonly included with many prescription medications,
and was not particular to the drug Prozac. It is unclear whether simple drowsiness
would be sufficient to constitute intoxication under the law, and there was no
evidence that Prozac in any quantify could cause the impairment of short term
memory, slurred speech or affected gait.
The state argues that all it has lo show to meet the first requirement of the
statute is that the subject was in actual control of a motor vehicle, which is not

Probable Cause Affidavit, State's Exhibit 2. The officer does not indicate in the affidavit how this was
communicated to him. I note that Feasel was also cited for driving on a suspended license at the time,
suggesting that this circumstance, rather than the medications, might have been why he would say he
should not have been driving. In any event, even the admission of the suspect, without expert qualification,
would not be sufficient to prove the necessary causal linkage of the identified dntg to the circumstances in
this case.
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challenged here, and that the subject was under the influence of a drug or other
intoxicating substance. It is this latter part of the required showing that causes
problems in this case. The state argues that all it need show to satisfy the
requirement of "under the influence" is that there be some degree of impairment
in the presence of the identified substance -which is all that is required for
alcohol intoxication. However, as noted above, the structure of proof under the
statute is entirely different where alcohol is the intoxicating substance. In alcohol
cases, the state does not need to prove proximate cause, because the linkage is
specified by statute - the evidentiary testing to a specific quantity of alcohol in
blood, breath or urine, which quantity is specifically proscribed in the statute.
With respect to drugs or other intoxicating substances, however, there is
no specific quantity set forth in the statute or returned in the test

result^.^ In this

case, then, structuring ihe argument on the same framework as an alcohol
intoxication case falls into the logical trap of post hoc ergopropter hoc - after
this therefore because of it - one of the major logical fallacies. It is not logically
sufficient for the proof of a proposition to argue that merely because one event
follows another that the first caused the latter without proving the causal
connection with competent evidence or compelling circumstances. Here, the mere
3

In this context, one does not "fail" a urine test for the presence of drugs, in the same context that one can
"fail" a BAC for alcohol. All that is returned on a urine test for the presence of dugs a positive or negative
for the identified drug - the test says nothing about the quantity of drug present in the subject's system, or
of the temporal relationship between ingestion of the drug and the test. Depending upon the half-life of the
drug in question the temporal relation may be a matter of hours to a matter of weeks. Given this, it is
unclear whether the results of the urine test in this case would have been sufficient under the statute in any
case. The statute, I.C. $ 18-8002A(4) set forth above, requires that the test indicate the presence of the drug
"in violation of' cited sections of the statutes. Since here, the test result only states the presence of the drug,
which alone is not a violation of any statute, hut does not state any quantity or other indicia fromwhich
some violation of law might be found, the test used in this case may not be sufficient. This depends upon a
grammatical dissection of the sentence, and a syntactical evaluation of where to attach the final
prepositional phrase quoted above, which is unnecessary to my evaluation in this case.
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taking of Prozac is not sufficient, standing alone, to prove that the impairments
that were later observed were caused by it.

In fact, other possibilities are, to my mind, equally probable. The
impairments may have been because of a medical disorder or physical disability
and not the medications, which would not have been a violation of the statute. The
impairments may have been because of one of the other medications and not the
Prozac -but the ALS statute requires a linkage between the intoxicating
substance and the evidentiary testing, without which the administrative
suspension is not available. The state cannot rely upon circumstantial evidence to
supply the missing foundation.
Without competent evidence that Prozac is an intoxicating substance,
meaning competent proof that taking Prozac in sufficient quantities will cause
impairment together with evidence that a sufficient quantity had, in fact, been
taken, or competent evidence that the elements of impairment - the slurred
speech, memory deficits and affected gait - are impairments that, in fact, do result
from taking Prozac, the essential linkage required to show a violation of LC. 5 188004 is missing.

I conclude that the proof in this case was insufficient to state a legal cause
as required under the first prong of LC. 5 18-8002A(4).
Conclusion

The order of the Idaho Transportation Department suspending the driving
license of Gary Alan Feasel is reversed. The case is remanded with directions to
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reinstate the petitioner's driving privileges and dismiss the action. Costs to the
petitioner.

Sr. Judge D. Duff McKee
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IN THIS DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
In The Matter Of:

1

GARY ALAN FEASEL,

)
)

1

Petitioner-Appellee,

)

Case No. CV OC 0800408
NOTICE OF APPEAL

1
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent-Appellant.

)

1
1

TO THE ABOVE-NAMED PETITIONER, GARY ALAN FEASEL, AND THE
PARTY'S ATTORNEY, ROBERT A. WALLACE, 815 PARK BLVD., SUITE 130, BOISE,
IDAHO 83712, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

Tile above-named Respondent appeals against the above-named Petitioner to the

Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision entered in the above-entitled action on
the 2"*day of September 2008, the Honorable D. Duff McKee presiding.
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2.

The party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the order

described in Paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule 1l(a)(2),
I.A.R.

3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal is as follows: Whether the

district court erred in finding no legal cause to believe that Petitioner-Appellee was under the
influence of drugs or other intoxicating substances such that the Idaho Transportation
Department was proper in suspending Petitioner-Appellee's driver's license pursuant to Idaho
Code 5 18-8002A(4).
This statement of issues on appeal shall not prevent the Respondent-Appellant from
asserting other issues on appeal.
4.

No order has been entered seallng any portion of the record.

5.

The Respondent-Appellant requests the following documents to be included in

the clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.:

6.

(a)

Transcript of the November 27, 2007, telephonic hearing;

(b)

Administrative Record for Judicial Review;

(c)

Petitioner's Opening Brief;

(h)

Respondent's Brief; and

(c)

Petitioner's Reply Brief.

I certify:
(a)

That, pursuant to Idaho Code

5 67-2301, the Respondent is exempt from

paying the fee for preparation of the clerk's record and any other Appellate filing fees;
(b)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served

pursuant to Rule 20, I.A.R.
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Date of Service:

NOV 2 2 2008

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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BY
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICLAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
GARY ALAN FEASEL,
Supreme Court Case No. 35720
Petitioner-Respondent,
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent-Appellant.
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the

State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels.

I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
30th day of September, 2008.

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
.%.,.
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BY
Deputy Clerk
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